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PSYCHOANALYSIS, EMOTIONS AND LIVING
A GOOD LIFE
Michael Lacewing
The central question of ethics is ‘How should I live?’. It
covers not only actions (‘what should I do?’), but more
broadly, our reactions and our characters, questions of
what we should feel and how we should be as people. This
has been the central concern of theories of virtue. Aristotle
claimed that a virtue is a character trait that enables us to
‘stand well’ in relation to our desires and emotions. To be
virtuous with regard to a type of emotion – anger, sadness,
joy, fear, etc. – is to feel that type of emotion ‘at the right
times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right
people, with the right motive, and in the right way’
(Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, Ch. 6, 1106b).
My question here is not this question, ‘How should I
live?’, but a question about this question: ‘How should we
think about this question in trying to answer it in practical
life?’. How should we deliberate about living a good life?
Ratiocentrism and akrasia
John Cottingham, in his book Philosophy and the Good
Life, coined the term ‘ratiocentrism’ for the view that the
good life can be understood in terms of, and attained by,
reason and strength of will. The thought, which has been
very widespread among philosophers since Plato, is that
we discover a ‘rational plan’ for how we should live through
rational reflection and deliberation. We then act accordingly.
However, the psychoanalytic model of human beings chal-
lenges this approach. There are two fundamental obstacles:
a lack of knowledge, particularly knowledge of ourselves,
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and a lack of control. We can see the importance of these
challenges through considering the phenomenon of
akrasia.
Akrasia, or weakness of will, is a matter of doing what
you believe is not best. Popular philosophical accounts
have suggested one of two things is going on when
someone acts akratically. The first is that one’s reason has
been ‘clouded’ by one’s emotions (using the term broadly
to include one’s desires): the person temporarily believes
that what they do is best. The second is that reason is
being ‘dragged around’ by one’s emotions. But we can
question whether the metaphor of force is really appropri-
ate. When emotions are particularly irrationally powerful, it
is as plausible that there is something about the emotions
that is not comprehended by reason. In either case, akrasia
is diagnosed by ratiocentrism to be a cognitive defect.
The solution is this: Reason – that is to say, we – must
come to understand our emotions. There are two ways this
can go. We can either come to understand the image of
‘goodness’ the emotion presents (e.g. the pleasure of eating
the cake, the power in achieving revenge) and then evalu-
ate this claim rationally; or we can come to understand that
the emotion is inherently confused – there is no coherent
‘good’ that it presents to us. Either way, once we understand
our emotions rationally, then they will fall into line.
Transparency and opacity
The problem is that this diagnosis assumes that our
emotions are ‘transparent’ to us. This idea needs clarifica-
tion. When we respond emotionally, we seek to understand
ourselves; above all, to understand the vision of the world
the emotion presents. To what are we responding, and how
is that object presented? What are the reasons for the
response? What explains the emotion’s intensity, or its being
caused now rather than on another, similar occasion? And
so on. We look for a ‘sufficient explanation’, either showing
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how our response and the way in which it represents the
world is appropriate, timely, proportionate, and so on; or
explaining why it was inappropriate or disproportionate, e.g.
as a result of a particular bad mood, or a sequence of
events that finally proved too much to bear. With our
desires, we seek to identify the good they seek and the
reasons for thinking it is good. We may seek to explain an
inappropriate desire on the basis of confused thinking about
what satisfaction its fulfilment would actually bring us. Now if
we were able, simply upon self-reflection, to provide such a
sufficient explanation that correctly identified the meaning of
the emotion, the emotions would be transparent.
Furthermore, we believe, often rightly, that if we under-
stand why we react as we do, this gives us some control
over the emotion. Our emotions clearly respond to reasons;
a reasoned account of the object and reasons for the
emotion should therefore alter it if necessary.
The psychoanalytic model of the mind challenges this
model of the emotions. We are unable to supply complete
and accurate accounts of the meaning of our emotions –
their object, content, intensity, cause, timing, or vision of
the good – simply through self-reflection. Emotions are
therefore not transparent, but opaque. And because they
are opaque, there are also recalcitrant. They cannot be
brought into line, by reason, with a plan for the good life
that reason has devised or discovered simply by rational
reflection upon them. The cause – or at least one impor-
tant cause – of the opacity of emotions is the presence of
unconscious influence on our emotions.
Examples and development
The psychoanalyst Karen Horney provides an example of
the problem ratiocentrism faces in her book Self-Analysis:
Let us assume that a wife is deeply disturbed at
learning that her husband has had a transient affair
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with another woman. Even months later she cannot
get over it, although she knows it is a matter of the
past and although the husband does everything to
re-establish a good relationship. She makes herself
and him miserable, and now and then goes on a
spree of bitter reproaches against him. There are a
number of reasons that might explain why she feels
and acts in this way, quite apart from a genuine hurt
about the breach of confidence. It may have hurt her
pride that the husband could be attached to anyone
but herself. It may be intolerable to her that the
husband could slip out from her control and domina-
tion. The incident may have touched off a dread of
desertion . . . She may be discontented with the
marriage for reasons of which she is not aware,
and she may use this conspicuous occurrence as
an excuse for expressing all her repressed grievances
. . . She may have felt attracted toward another man
and resent the fact that her husband indulged in a
freedom that she had not allowed herself. (283–4;
italics added)
I italicised the short phrase to indicate that psychoanalysis
does not dismiss our usual reasons or explanations for our
emotions. These can be perfectly valid as far as they go,
but they are only part of the story.
How is the wife to discover which of the possibilities
Horney proposes is true? Psychoanalysis argues that our
minds have an in-built tendency to keep painful mental
states and what becomes associated with them out of con-
sciousness. Faced with such states, we are liable to uncon-
sciously pervert our experience of reality – both ‘external’
reality, including what other people think and feel, and our
own psychological reality – by imagining it to be different.
But a misrepresentation of reality will lead to a misrepre-
sentation of what is good and how to live. So we need a
new model, one that leaves ratiocentrism behind, of how to
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address the influence of unconscious meanings on our
judgements of how to live.
A second example. Anna Freud, in The Ego and its
Mechanisms of Defence, discusses a form of ‘false altruism’.
A woman represses her own wishes, and projects them onto
others. She then strongly identifies with other people. She
therefore expresses great concern for them, but not for
herself. She believes it is acceptable to fulfil their desires, and
works to do so, but not to fulfil her own. However, she also
becomes annoyed if their desires are frustrated, as if wishes
should be fulfilled without hindrance; and she becomes angry
with people who are not similarly altruistic, as though this
were some personal affront to her. Nietzsche also comments
on false altruism: ‘In helpful and benevolent people one
nearly always finds a clumsy cunning that first rearranges the
person who is to be helped so that, for example, he ‘deserves’
their help, needs their help in particular, and will prove to be
deeply grateful, dependent, subservient for all their help. With
fantasies such as these they control the needy like a piece of
property’ (Beyond Good and Evil, §194).
The point here is not only that having this complexity of
emotions leads to unvirtuous actions – though it does. For
our discussion, what is more important is that it leads to an
inaccurate or distorted view of the moral situation and one’s
reasons for acting. Horney’s example raises the question,
‘What is the appropriate response, in this particular relation-
ship, to infidelity?’. Cases of false altruism raise the ques-
tion, ‘What is the appropriate understanding of the needs of
others, the nature of suffering, and our responsibility to alle-
viate it?’. The emotions described in the examples prevent
the people involved from being able to get a clear moral
understanding of their situation.
The psychology
The psychology involved is complex. In his book, The
Spiritual Dimension, John Cottingham lists the following as
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distorting factors: pride, vanity, self-importance, fear, embar-
rassment, self-defensiveness, envy, greed, self-absorption,
and fantasies of power. All these can trigger ‘defence
mechanisms’. Defence mechanisms utilize mental pro-
cesses that, using the imagination, change what we think
so as to reduce or eliminate anxiety or the other painful
feelings just mentioned. This barring of certain states from
consciousness affects what we understand of ourselves, of
others, of the situations in which we find ourselves, in other
words, the world as we experience it, and therefore of
course, our deliberations about how to live a good life in
the here and now.
A brief aside: psychoanalysis argues that much of the
unconscious influence on our emotions stems from
the past. Our emotions have a long psychic history, with
the current objects of our love, hate, fear, joy, and so on,
being ‘layered’ on top of previous objects. There are
relationships of symbolism between the present and the
past. A powerful recent empirically-grounded theory of child
development, attachment theory, suggests that our early
relationships with others create a ‘working model’ of
relationships (how they are, how they should be). This
model then affects our perception, cognition and motivation
in myriad ways.
Distortions in our emotions, then, need not be isolated
events; our emotions, rather, present us with an entire
world-view. A further example, from Jonathan Lear’s
Therapeutic Action:
A patient of mine inhabited a disappointing world.
Although she was quite successful at work, had
friends, and so on, there was no success in the
social world that would not be interpreted by her
under an aura of disappointment. If she got a raise at
work, it was because the boss was shamed into it –
he really wanted to give someone else in the office a
raise, but he felt he had to give her one to appear
fair. If she was invited out for a date, the person had
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already tried to go out with others and had failed. If
someone congratulated her on some accomplish-
ment, they were just being polite. And so on. From a
distance it is clear to us, as it was not clear to her,
how active she was in understanding her world in
ways that were bound to disappoint. And, of course,
much of the analysis was spent working through
these repetitive attempts at disappointment. (48–9)
To assure ourselves of reliability in our judgements about
how to live, we need to be able to discover the meaning of
our emotions. In the light of the argument so far, we can
see that neither the resolve to weigh up reasons better nor
to act more consistently on the reasons we perceive is suf-
ficient to overcome the difficulty the opacity of our passions
presents to a ratiocentric vision of living the good life. We
need to go beyond purely rational self-reflection, as this is
usually understood, to a ‘deeper’ process of self-enquiry
that can reveal the unconscious elements of our emotional
live.
The proposal
Gaining knowledge of the meanings of one’s emotions
and choices is not knowledge one can acquire without
changing as a person. The change that is required cannot
be performed by either intellectual insight or strength of
will, traditionally the two powers at reason’s disposal.
Instead, the transformation requires
a) recovering and accepting, as parts of oneself,
those parts of oneself that have been rejected;
b) accepting one’s vulnerability – both one’s
vulnerability in childhood and one’s vulnerability
now to the effects of childhood; this involves a
form of relinquishing control, not just initially, but
permanently. Because vulnerability is always
potentially painful, and the parts of the self that
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were rejected were so because of the pain they
cause or threaten to cause, accepting one’s
vulnerability involves the courage to endure
psychic pain;
c) undoing one’s defence mechanisms;
d) compassion for oneself, which enables the
above.
Recovery and vulnerability
Recovery is not just a matter of discovery, although this
forms part of it. The self is not to be identified just with
reason, but also with what comes to be known. In recovery,
parts of the self that have been disowned come to be inte-
grated into the self. Or to put it another way, what is at
issue is how the self is, whether it is able to be itself fully,
through the full extent of its emotional experience.
Recovery, then, is a process of self-transformation.
A first step in the process of reclaiming parts of oneself
is, as Cottingham expresses it, ‘an acknowledgement of
precisely the fallibility, vulnerability and dependence that is
an integral part of the strange openness we experience in
our emotional lives. . . It is only by giving up, in the first
instance, our pretensions to rational control that we open
the way for deeper, transformed, self-understanding’
(Philosophy and the Good Life, 147). The sense of vulner-
ability deepens in the realization that it is inescapable, a
realization that comes with the understanding of one’s
emotions, and their roots in one’s childhood past. The influ-
ence of the past never ceases, even when it has been
reclaimed, after which one is able to appreciate and moder-
ate it, not eradicate it. And so openness to one’s emotional
life, a willingness to at least tolerate and admit into thought
whatever it is one feels, is necessary for self-knowledge to
continue.
This form of emotional openness is always potentially
painful. After all, defence mechanisms are means by which
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we control emotions or parts of ourselves that threaten
psychological pain. If we return for a moment to akrasia,
akratic passions are not ones we are comfortable with, and
the parts of the self they express are ones we find most dif-
ficult to contemplate. We may, for instance, find it quite
inconceivable that we could ever want this or feel this way;
it seems so childish or unreasonable. This pain is unavoid-
able in the process of recovery. Facing up to pain calls for
courage.
Defence mechanisms and the will
Now courage is often understood as steeling one’s will.
But it is paradoxical to think of someone ‘steeling’ them-
selves to be vulnerable, to tolerate whatever emotional
experience arises. There is a relinquishing of the will here.
The courage of vulnerability is the courage of letting go, of
allowing oneself to feel that which is painful. This contrasts
with courage in the face of physical pain, which does
involve steeling oneself; what the two forms have in
common is that both enable one to continue functioning
despite the pain, to not give up on one’s end. In the case
of deepening self-knowledge, this is to not give up on
letting go of attempts to control one’s experience of one’s
emotion.
Furthermore, defence mechanisms are not within the
remit of the will, and so an act of will is not enough to
undo them. Defence mechanisms are purposeful in
aiming to reduce psychic pain, but do not involve
choices. They are part of the nature of the mind, and
they interact with the will, but they are not within or
directly under the control of the will. Rather, they may be
described as the psychic equivalent to the reflex mechan-
ism of withdrawing one’s body from a painful stimulus.
The psychic pain, or threat of pain, is sufficient to redirect
the attention away from the passion without the interven-
tion of the will.
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Defence mechanisms are usually reinforced by a false
and idealized sense of oneself; the parts of oneself
defended against, even after their existence is acknowl-
edged, are not yet one’s own in the same way in which
one identifies with other traits with which one is content.
The pain caused lies not, or not only, in the disowned part
of the self; it lies also in the gap between that part and
one’s self-image. On the one hand, our emotions aspire to
expression and fulfilment; on the other hand, we can aspire
to virtuous ideals beyond our present means, or even
beyond human means. When these conflict, we pretend,
on the one hand, that our emotions do not exist, or that
they are adequately fulfilled, or that they are no part of our
‘true self’; on the other hand, we pretend that we meet the
ideals we hold for ourselves, or that we can, that they are
reasonable. But these ideals can themselves be defensive
reactions to our emotions. Accepting our emotions means
bridging the gap between aspiration and pretence.
The importance of compassion
What enables the developments described above is com-
passion for oneself. The ability to tolerate, to bear, suffering
– anxiety, guilt, shame, anguish – without denying the
reality of that which causes it is usually identified as part of
compassion. Of course, we normally think of compassion
as directed towards others; here I argue we need com-
passion for ourselves. The emotions with which we feel
ourselves in conflict, as in akrasia, often seem intolerable
because they threaten our sense of ourselves as accepta-
ble, as lovable. Recovery and vulnerability involve com-
passion because it countermands this sense – it is
possible for me to tolerate the emotion and the pain it
brings, and hence to come to know and understand it,
because the fact that I feel this emotion does not mean I
am unlovable. Compassion for oneself and one’s emotions
is an attitude towards one’s emotions that allows them to
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exist, to be felt, because it pulls the sting that leads us to
distort our experience of ourselves, to deny or misunderstand
the emotions we have.
Michael Lacewing is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at
Heythrop College, University of London. m.lacewing@hey-
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